To what extent can Walmart’ s competitive advantages be transferred into international spheres?
Based in Bentonville, Arkansas, Walmart Stores, Inc. was founded in 1945 by Sam Walton and is now one of the largest retailers worldwide. It operates stores in a variety of formats, such as supermarkets, discount stores, warehouse clubs, and online properties. Its product offerings are wide-ranging: automotive accessories, food and beverages, cosmetics, clothing, and housewares. Walmart’s strategy is to be the low-cost leader among mass merchandisers. It operates on a scale unmatched by any of its competitors. To pursue its strategy, Walmart focuses on using advanced systems and technologies to reduce costs, improving relationships with suppliers by purchasing enormous quantities, and being a tough bargainer.
Competitive Advantages
Competitive advantage is anything that a company has, or does better, that customers value but the competition cannot match. The following sections discuss how Walmart uses its value chain throughout its primary activities to achieve its strategy and have a competitive advantage.
• Efficient Inbound and Outbound Logistics: Products from distributors and suppliers are transported to Walmart’s distribution centers via its large truck fleet transportation system and in case of perishables such as groceries are concerned, products are managed by Walmart’s suppliers’ inventory management systems connected directly to the store. Walmart also uses a technique known as “cross docking” whereby finished goods are taken straight from the supplier’s site, sorted, and delivered directly to the store. This leads to a reduction in the handling and storage of finished goods, resulting in fewer damaged goods and decreased staff needs. The efficiency of this system leads to a form of just-in-time inventory, allowing customers to control the supply of goods they want by their purchases.
Low cost strategy: Covering the traditional marketing four P’s of product, place, price, and promotion, Walmart uses these activities to support its low-cost strategy. At Walmart, customers buy products knowing that the store will deliver value in excess of its costs and that Walmart stands behind the goods it sells as a trustworthy merchandiser. In regards to price, Walmart has long implemented an everyday low price guarantee, reinforcing its motto of “Save Money. Live Better.” This motto supports its strategy because by guaranteeing the lowest price, Walmart reduces the expense and profit erosion caused by having to run frequent sales to move merchandise.
Store format and locations: Walmart’s store formats have long been central to its success, allowing it to maximize its attractiveness to a broad spectrum of customers. Its in-store layout makes for fast movement of product to the shelves and allows easy stocking. Walmart’s stock replenishment process is focused on managing the flow of goods through its stores, using a model it has led the development of—vendor- managed inventories. This enables Walmart to achieve higher levels of sales per square foot of floor space in comparison to most of its competitors. In determining where it places stores, Walmart uses a stringent set of criteria to select locations where it will have maximum market impact. Additionally, Walmart applies data mining and proprietary algorithms to determine where products are placed for maximum sales volume within its stores.
Systems and Technology: Walmart is one of the world’s leading companies in any retail sector at
developing and employing ways in which technology, both advanced and simple, can improve its operations. It supports and reinforces its low-cost strategy all along the value chain through its tightly integrated vendor and inventory management systems, to its use of satellite communications to track its truck fleet, to RFID tagging and advanced POS systems for merchandising operations in the store. It also uses low-tech, but highly effective, person-to-person and face-to-face communication practices.
Human Capital Management: Walmart has a unique way of linking its human capital management practice with its strategy all along its value chain. Interactions between the company and its associates are based on mutual respect, regular communication, high expectations, and clear incentives. Associates are not paid market-leading wages, thus reinforcing the company’s ability to keep its prices low for customers. But employees are compensated in other ways. They have access to desirable benefits such as profit sharing and health care, retirement, and company stock purchase plans. Employees have a surprisingly high degree of discretion and autonomy. The company has an open-door policy, and great promotion opportunities create a unique culture unusual in large retail organizations. This adds value throughout Walmart’s chain by sustaining a good working environment for associates and managers. Unusual but long-standing Saturday morning meetings are the trademark of the company’s management style.
Services: The central theme of Walmart services is the customer experience. Customers entering a store
are met by greeters wearing blue vests who create a welcoming and helpful experience. Throughout the store, price-check scanners allow customers to verify how much they will pay for their goods. Another beneficial service is Walmart’s “no questions asked” return policy. Its “sundown rule” states that employees will do their best to answer customer requests by the close of business on the day they are received. The “10-foot rule” is a customer service policy whereby associates greet nearby customers and ask if they can be of assistance. All these activities reinforce the customer experience Walmart seeks to achieve at the lowest costs.
Procurement: Walmart has developed a small number of highly efficient regional procurement centers.
Some of its largest suppliers, such as Proctor & Gamble, have set up satellite offices next to these centers to improve their ability to work with Walmart and manage its inventories while simultaneously reducing transaction and transportation costs. Walmart requires suppliers to cut their margins and meet its progressive employment policies, although it often assists them in doing so. These practices have enabled Walmart to buy its inputs at the lowest cost, avoid inventory holding costs, and offer lower-priced products that its customers value.
Application of Porter’s five forces Model to Walmart
Walmart’s competitiveness can also be interpreted in terms of Porter’s five forces model very well. Here we focus on Walmart’s position as a retail giant and competes with fellow retail chains or online stores such as K-mart, Target and Amazon.
Threat of New Entry: New entrants to an industry can raise the level of competition, thereby reducing its attractiveness. The threat of new entrants largely depends on the barriers to entry. For Walmart, Entry barriers are relatively high, as Walmart has an outstanding distribution systems, locations, brand name, and financial capital to fend off competitors. Walmart often has an absolute cost advantage over other competitors. Cost to build retail enterprise like Walmart is formidable.
The Threat of Substitutes: When it comes to this market, there are not many substitutes that offer convenience and low pricing. The customers has the choice of going to many specialty stores to get their desired products but are not going to find Walmart’s low pricing. Online shopping proves another alternative because it is so different and the customer can gain price advantages because the company does not necessarily have to have a brick and mortar store, passing the savings onto the consumer.
The Bargaining Power of Buyers: The individual buyer has little to no pressure on Walmart. Consumer advocate groups have complained about Walmart’s pricing techniques. Consumer could shop at a competitor who offers comparable products at comparable prices, but the convenience is lost.
The Bargaining Power of Suppliers: Some of the major suppliers of Walmart are: Gillette, Hewlett-Packard, Johnson & Johnson, Kimberly-Clark, Kraft Foods, Nestle, Purina Pet Care Company, Procter & Gamble and Unilever. Since Walmart holds so much of the market share, they offer a lot of business to manufacturers and wholesalers. This gives Walmart a lot of power because by Walmart threatening to switch to a different supplier would create a
scare tactic to the suppliers. Walmart could vertically integrate. Walmart does deal with some large suppliers like
Proctor & Gamble, Coca-Cola who has more bargaining power than small suppliers.
The Rivalry among the Existing Players: Currently, there are three main incumbent companies that exist in the same market as Walmart: Sears, K Mart, and Target. Target is the strongest of the three in relation to retail. Target has experienced tremendous growth in their domestic markets and have defined their niche quite effectively Sears and K-Mart seem to be drifting and have not challenged K-Mart in sometime. Mature industry life cycle.
Globalizing Walmart:
When Walmart began to expand internationally, it had to decide which countries to target. Although the European retail market was large, to succeed there Walmart would have had to take market share from established competitors. Instead, Walmart deliberately selected emerging markets as its starting point for international expansion. In Latin America, it targeted nations with large, growing populations – Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil – and in Asia it aimed at China.
Latin America:
For its first international store, opened in 1991 in Mexico City, the company used a 50-50 joint venture. This entry mode helped Walmart manage the substantial differences in culture and income between the United States and Mexico. Its Mexican partner, the retail conglomerate, Cifra, provided expertise in operating in the Mexican market and a base for learning about retailing in that country. Still, learning the dos and don’ts was a difficult process. In Mexico City, they built large parking lots at some of their Mexican stores, only to realize that many of their customers rode the bus to the store, they trudged across those large parking lots with bags full of merchandise. So they responded by creating bus shuttles to drop customers off at the door. These were all mistakes that were easy to address, but Walmart worked smarter internationally to avoid cultural and regional problems on the front end. After gaining experience with partners, in 1997 Walmart expanded further in Mexico by acquiring a controlling interest in Cifra, which it renamed in 2000 to Walmart de Mexico S.A. de C.V. By 2006, Walmart operated 808 units in Mexico in 30 states, achieving annual sales of %15.8 billion and employing over 130,000. IT accounts for over half of all super market sales in
Mexico.
When it entered Brazil in 1996, Walmart was able to leverage its learning from the Mexican experience to take a majority position in a 60-40 venture with a local retailer Lojas Americana. Walmart’s initial entry into Brazil used greenfield store sites and emphasized aggressive pricing to build market share, but the French retailer Carrefour and other Brazilian competitors retaliated, launching a costly price war. Walmart’s strength in international sourcing was initially of limited assistance in Brazil, since the leading sales category – food – was primarily sourced locally, where Carrefour and others already had strong relationships with local suppliers. Over time, Walmart changed its competitive emphasis to customer service and a broader merchandise mix than smaller local companies could match. The company also pursued acquisitions to supplement internal growth, buying 118 Bompreco stores in 2004 and 140 Sonae stores in 2005. By 2006, Walmart was the third-largest retailer in Brazil, operating 293 stores and employing 50,000 associates.
The Challenge of China
The lure of China, the world’s most populous nation, proved too great to ignore. Walmart was one of the first international retailers in China when it set up operations in 1996. Concerned about their potential impact on local firms, Beijing restricted the operations of foreign retailers. These restrictions included requirements for government – backed partners and limitations on the number and location of stores. Initially, Walmart partner was Charoen pokphand, a Thai conglomerate with massive investments in China and a strong track record with join ventures. This venture was terminated after 18 months, due to differences regarding control. A new venture was subsequently formed with two politically connected partners, Shenzhen Economic Development Zone and Shenzhen International Trust and Investment Corporation, and Walmart was able to negotiate a controlling stake in the venture. The first Chinese Walmart store was in Shenzhen. Walmart had many well-publicized miscues while learning how to do business in China. Operationally, the scarcity of highly modernized suppliers in China frustrated Walmart’s initial attempts to achieve high levels of efficiency. Barcoding was not standardized in China, and retailers had to either recode goods themselves or distribute labels to suppliers, procedures that increased costs and hindered efficiency. Pressure to appease the government’s desire for local sourcing of products, while maintaining the aura of being American shopping experience, Walmart’s solution was to source about 85 percent of the Chinese stores’ purchases from local manufacturers but heavily weight purchasing toward locally produced American brands (such as products from Procter & Gamble’s factories in China). Walmart also mass-markets Chinese products that were previously available only in isolated parts of the country, such as coconut juice from Guangdong province, hams and mushrooms from rural Yunnan, and oats from Fujian province.
Walmart also learned the importance of building relationships with agencies from the central and local governments and with local communities. Bureaucratic red tape, graft, and lengthy delays in the approval process proved to be aggravating. The company learned to curry favor through actions such as inviting Chinese officials to visit Walmart’s headquarters in the United States, assisting local charities, and even building a school for the local community. A major change in Walmart’s China growth strategy occurred in October 2006. It was announced that the company had outbid competitor’s Carrefour, the United Kingdom’s Tesco, and Lianhua of China to acquire Trust-Mart, a chain of over 100 supercenters located in 20 cities across China. This acquisition, for approximately $1 billion, would immediately give Walmart the largest network of food and department stores in China, with combined sales of over $3billion for 2006.
Different approach for entering Canada and UK
Strong, entrenched competitors in these mature, developed country markets hindered Walmart’s prospects for obtaining critical mass solely through internal growth. Rather than first developing its retail operations from scratch, as in Latin America and Asia, Walmart entered via acquisitions. The company entered Canada by acquiring 122 Woolco stores in 1994. Walmart quickly restructured the money-losing Canadian operations, applying many of the practices that had been successful in the United States. Transition teams were brought in from the United States to help with the transformation, and within two years the Canadian operations were profitable. Its 278 stores, employing 70,000 associates, now account for more than 35 percent of the Canadian discount and department-store retail market. The company entered the United Kingdom in 1999 through the acquisition of the 22 store ASDA group. These acquisitions allowed Walmart to build market share quickly with the highly advanced and competitive European retail market. From this base, additional growth is anticipated through the opening of new stores, supplemented with further acquisitions. It is second-largest supermarket chain in the United Kingdom, with 321 stores and 140,000 associates, but has been losing ground to industry leader Tesco Plc.
Failure in Germany and South Korea
In Europe, Walmart entered Germany by acquiring the profitable 21 unit Wertkauf hypermarket chain in 1998 and 74 Interspar stores in 1999. Acquiring two German companies within a year proved too much for the company to handle with its European Infrastructure.
Efforts to centralize purchasing and leverage Walmart’s famous competencies in information systems and inventory management were stymied by problems with suppliers that were not familiar with such practices. The introduction of Walmart’s “always low prices“ approach met resistance from competitors and regulators. Indeed, the company was ordered by Germany’s Cartel Office to raise prices, charging that Walmart helped to spark a price war by illegally selling some items below cost. Walmart also challenged existing retail practices regarding hours of operation. Laws required shops to close by 8p.m on weekdays and 4 p.m. on Saturdays and to remain closed on Sundays. However, Walmart stores began to open by 7AM, two hours earlier than most competitors, and the company has lobbied for additional reforms to allow later closing times. These changes have sparked vehement opposition from smaller competitors and employees’ unions.
As it struggled to build a strong competitive base, Walmart Germany lost between $120 million and $200 million in 1999, and the losses continued each year following. Cultural factors also played a role in causing an aversion towards the store – Germans are known to be efficient and spend as little time in the shops as possible. However, Walmart’s stalls were placed in such a way that the customer will have to spend more time shop. Walmart put all premium products at eye level, while all the discount products were stored either at the bottom shelve or on the top one. This irritated German customers a lot. Lacking the scale of operations to create competitive advantage, and facing strong competition in a mature marketplace, in July 2006 Walmart announced it was selling its German operations to a competitor, Metro.
With their strategy of “everyday low prices,” Wal-Mart is very successful in the United States and elsewhere. However, due to the extreme competition, Germans are accustomed to the low prices that are offered by numerous discount supermarket chains. For this reason, Wal-Mart’s low price strategy did not create sufficient competitive advantage in Germany.
Earlier that year, Walmart has also announced that it was selling its Korean operations to competitor Shinsegae after Walmart failed to achieve scale and performance in that Asian Market. When first Wal-Mart opened its doors in South Korea in 1998, it was sensational with mixed welcome by competitors and consumers. Wal-Mart had relied on its proven business model and its strategy in offering low prices for products. However, low prices alone were insufficient to make a successful business case in South Korea. South Koreans have different consumer preferences than Americans do; they are not necessarily interested in the same products. For instance, South Koreans like fresh vegetables and fresh food rather than dry products and the type of clothing that Wal-Mart sells. The South Korean culture is also very tied into its markets; they are one of the largest countries that are deeply involved in local markets. Most Wal-Mart outlets in South Korea were placed outside instead of in the cities. South Koreans expect easy accessibility to shopping facilities within the larger cities without the need to travel. Also, South Korean consumers shop more frequently than most Americans do. They may not purchase many things at once, but they will usually get at least one item. Some individuals felt that Wal-Mart should have been located in the center of the cities where consumers felt more comfortable with their shopping needs. South Koreans do not distinguish between discounts and normal prices. Thus, they may not see a compelling reason to shop at Wal-Mart.
Struggle in Japan
Wal-Mart entered Japan in 2002 by using its usual foreign strategy of forming a joint-venture (used to help with economic and political challenges) with Seiyu and begins reorganizing structure; implements point-of-sale and SMART inventory tracking systems across 53 stores. Wal-Mart acquires 34% stake in company in 2003, becoming the Seiyu’s biggest shareholder. By 2008, Wal-Mart completely acquires Seiyu for $875 million, taking 100% ownership of the company and makes Seiyu a subsidiary of the company but struggles to post a profit. Wal-Mart failed to grasp the consumer and retail environment in Japan. With a population of 127 million, the highest per capita income and the second largest economy in the world, Japan is a very attractive market for retailers. The opportunity exists, but there is much more research and planning that needed to be done before expansion began. Instead of adapting business operations to the Japanese culture, the company essentially assumed the Japanese would readily adapt to Wal-Mart’s. This was not the case. For example, in Japan there is a much larger need for local store customization. The culture tends to buy more fresh produce than pre-packaged goods as well (something Wal-Mart does not usually specialize in). Lastly, the Japanese view high price as equaling high quality. This mentality causes them to purchase 40% of the world’s luxury goods annually. Packaging and appearance of goods play a huge role in their purchasing decisions. When looking at Walmart’s product selection, it is obvious they do not usually cater to luxury-brand customers. All of these cultural misunderstandings lead Wal-Mart away from success in Japan.
In Japan there are strong and close-knit supplier webs that provide retailers with their goods. This country puts a higher value on close, local relationships, making it very difficult for foreign firms to enter the industry. With so many changes in products due to local store specifications, it forces firms to deal with many different suppliers. This is not favorable to large retailers, as they don’t have the time or national presence to make the necessary relationships to do business. Wal-Mart is not used to this high level of supplier power. Their value usually comes from cutting costs with suppliers enough to pass onto their customers while using synergy to increase efficiencies. Difficulties managing their supply chain are another substantial reason Wal-Mart is struggling in Japan
India: Anticipating the Opening Up of a Billion Market
Walmart is currently positioning for entry into India, which has the largest population of any nation the company is not currently in. Although it is the world’s eighth –largest retail market at $250 billion, the inefficiency of the Indian retail sector is well-known. Over 95 percent of the retail sales are made through tea stands, newspaper stalls, and mom and pop stores. Strict government barriers have prevented foreign owned retail businesses, although that situation might change soon. However, exploiting the potential of India could be a major challenge, particularly given the country’s notoriously frustrating bureaucracy and poor infrastructure. Walmart will have to learn to manage highly protectionist and anti-capitalist political parties, a bad road system, frequent power outages, and lack of adequate distribution and cold-storage systems, among other concerns. The diversity of the country could also prove problematic, with 18 official languages and widely varying regional consumer cultures. Savvy new Indian chains, such as Provogue and shipper stop are starting to emerge, and nationalist sentiments may produce much sternation for expansion efforts of foreign companies such as Walmart.
In preparing for an eventual opening of the market, Walmart has been building a foundation by establishing relationships with Indian supplier distributors, and consumers. The company has been conducting market studies, hiring a team of local managers, and building relationships with Indian politicians and bureaucrats. In 2005, Walmart purchased $1.5 billion in Indian products for export and sale in its stores abroad. In 2007, Wal-Mart announced with great fanfare that along with Bharti, it planned to open “hundreds” of stores, the kind of ambitious proposition that many international companies hatched early in the century as hopes blossomed that India would soon join China as an emerging economic colossus. Today, Walmart advance on India is barely moving.
Conclusion
Customer needs and interests as well as the nature of competition and the market infrastructure differ from one market to another. Consequently, a firm needs to modify its domestic positional advantage to each market in order to be successful. Walmart enters foreign markets by purchasing large stakes in similar retailers and takes gradual control of ownership by increasing investment through time. Historically these acquisitions are gradual, and have been met with both success and failure. Since Wal-Mart holds so much of the market share, they offer a lot of business to manufacturers and wholesalers. This gives Walmart a lot of power because by Walmart threatening to switch to a different supplier would create a scare tactic to the suppliers. Walmart could vertically integrate. These strategies combining with Walmart’s low price strategy created huge competitive advantages and succeeded in countries like Unites States, Mexico and Brazil but it doesn’t have the same effect in Germany or in Japan where quality comes first than the price for the local people.
The retail giant has struggled in countries like India, South Korea, Germany and Japan as it discovered that its formula for success – low prices, zealous inventory control and a large array of merchandise – did not translate to markets with their own discount chains and shoppers with different habits. Over all, Walmart is still expanding outside the United States, particularly in markets where it entered by acquiring a strong retailer. Still, given Wal-Mart’s formidable record at home, the company’s recent setbacks have exposed a rare vulnerability overseas. Some of WalMart’s problems stem from hubris, a uniquely powerful American enterprise trying to impose its values around the world. At Walmart headquarters in Bentonville, Ark., however, the message from these missteps is now registering loud and clear.
References
- The Complete Guide to Business Analytics (Collection) - Thomas H. Davenport, Publisher: FT Press.
- Organizational Survival: Profitable Strategies for a Sustainable Future - Gregory Balestrero; Nathalie UdoPublisher: McGraw-Hill
- http://globalmarketingtoday.wordpress.com/the-real-world/case-study-1/
- Configural Advantage in Global Markets – pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sdouglas/rpubs/config.html
- http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/02/business/worldbusiness/02walmart.html?pagewanted=a ll
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