2015年3月29日 星期日

旅遊貼士:到達高原後應注意事項

1.剛到高原,每個人都會感到不同程度的氣短、胸悶、呼吸困難等缺氧症狀。但這並不說明你不適應高原,如果能夠正確地保護自己,2~4天后,一般都可使上述症狀好轉或消失。

2.如果是坐飛機上高原,一般高山反應的症狀會在12~14小時左右產生。所以,剛剛到高原的時候一定不要劇烈運動,而要立刻臥床休息。否則,一旦感覺到反應就需要更多的時間來適應了。

3.人們常常用吸氧來緩解除胸悶不適。當然,吸氧能暫時解除胸悶、氣短、呼吸困難等症狀,但停止吸氧後症狀又會重新出現,延緩了適應高原的時間。假若你上述症狀不很嚴重的話,建議最好不要吸氧,這樣可以使你更快適應高原環境。輕微的高原反應,會不治自愈,不要動輒吸氧,以免形成依賴性。

4.進藏後要多吃碳水化合物、易消化的食品;多喝水,使體內保持充分的水分;晚餐不宜過飽。最好不要飲酒和吸煙。要多食水果、蔬菜等富含維生素的食物。

5.注意避免過度疲勞,飲食起居有規律。初到高原的前幾天,不要頻頻洗浴,以免受涼引起感冒。感冒常常是急性高原肺水腫的主要誘因(在缺氧狀態下不易痊癒)

6.在藏期間,旅遊活動不宜過於頻繁,身體負荷不宜過重。初到高原的時候,不可急速行走,更不能跑步,也不能做體力勞動。一周後,才可逐漸增加一定的活動量。

7.必須注意,如果進入高原後,反應的症狀愈來愈重,特別是靜息時也十分明顯,應該立即吸氧,並到醫院就診。極少出現的高原肺水腫和高原腦水腫的病人須大量吸氧,並在藥物治療的同時,迅速轉送海拔低的地區。

8.常年堅持體育鍛煉而身體素質較好者,高原反應甚微,且能很快自愈,但也不可因此大意而逞強尤其是進入到新的海拔高度前,要有一兩天的漸進適應性鍛煉,在沒有適應和準備的情況下,不要驟然進入海拔5000米以上的地區,以防突發不測。
  

總之,無論男女老幼、體強體弱,保持健康、樂觀的心態至關重要,只要你能遵循上述幾點,就會在進藏後很快驅除高原反應的困擾,乘興而來,盡興而歸。

2015年3月23日 星期一

Walmart's Strategic Analysis

1. Define Wal-Mart’s strategy
Traditionally, Wal-Mart has essentially had a low-cost, high volume strategy. The strategy aims at
customer satisfaction through low prices and relatively good customer service. Here are the basic details.
• Low cost: Wal-Mart has lower operating expenses than the industry average. The primary cost
advantage is Wal-Mart’s superior distribution capability (location of stores, inside-out growth patterns,
cross-docking, superior information management). Quantitative details on cost advantage are set forth in
Section 3 below.
• High Volume: Industry analysts watch Wal-Mart’s growth of sales figure very closely. Wal-
Mart’s prices are low by the industry standard, which, combined with its lower costs, indicates a strategy
that aims at growth in volume through grabbing increased market share (cf. Dell).
• Customer Satisfaction: Low prices, advanced data management and extremely motivated
employees (“10 ft rule”, “sundown rule”) means a better customer experience than at other discount
retailers, even though Wal-Mart remains a self-service retailer. In addition, the large size of the
traditional Wal-Mart stores adds convenience by offering a one-stop solution by offering a wide range of
products.
In the words of Sam Walton, “Wal-Mart’s aims at creating a loyal customer base by lowering their
cost of living through offering quality and other products at significantly lower prices, while surprising
them on the convenience and service level side.”
It’s worth mentioning that Wal-Mart acquired volume through a careful consideration of locations,
away from competition. Today, however, Wal-Mart is experimenting with extending its original strategy.
There are three avenues being considered: internationalization, different formats (neighborhood stores)
and expanding the product range to offer more complete “customer solutions” like travel, insurance and
banking services. These growth options are discussed in Section 6. Still, in terms of strategy, we can say
here that the “internationalization” option is essentially an extension of Wal-Mart’s traditional strategy to
different countries (which is no doubt why Wal-Mart is pursuing it so aggressively), whereas the other two
options are new ground for Wal-Mart (which explains why they are being much more tentative in those
areas).
2. Evaluate the attractiveness of the discount retailing industry
We have analyzed the market attractiveness from the perspective of an existing player in the discount
retailing industry (as opposed to from the perspective of an entrant). We conclude that, for the average
retailer, the industry is unattractive principally because of the intense internal rivalry among the principal
retailers and the low switching cost for end-customers.
• Suppliers: weak power
3
The suppliers are the consumer goods manufacturers (both food and durables) and they have little power.
In the first place, with very few exceptions, the consumer goods are commodities (or at least, acceptable
substitutes are readily available, both from other manufacturers and from in-house private labels). The
availability of alternative suppliers puts the retailers in a strong position. In addition, retailers have high
power of negotiation due to the high volumes purchased (and the projected growth of the discount
market). Who wants to put off a retailer who supplies 15% of a growing market? The limited number of
big discount retailers also creates an imbalance in the importance of the accounts for the retailers and the
suppliers. A Wal-Mart or Target account is enormously important to a supplier, but Wal-Mart can easily
live without this or that supplier. (Of course, the suppliers have more power vs. smaller or newer
entrants.)
• Buyers: average power
The end-consumer has significant power, because of (a) the ready availability of substitutes (for the most
part you can shop elsewhere), (b) the ease of switching between different stores (customers are not lockedin)
and (c) the lack of real differentiation among the retailers. Since all the retailers explicitly compete on
value, shoppers can easily compare the offerings. The transparency of any price advantages on what are
generally commodity products decreases consumer loyalty. As a result, any retailer that underperforms on
day 1 (being out of stock on milk for example) can find himself losing customers on day 2.
• Internal rivalry: strong
Of the 15 top discount stores shown in Exhibit 3 to the 1993 case, three were in Chapter 11 proceedings in
1993 and at least one more has declared bankruptcy since then (Kmart). Enough said? Obviously,
competition is fierce among discount retailers. The reasons are (a) the lack of differentiation in product
offerings, (b) low switching costs for end consumers and (c) volume-driven strategies that aim at grabbing
market-share at the expense of profitability (which creates a potential for price wars). The heavy pressure
for increases in volume arises because only volume allow the retailer to generate cost efficiencies, which
can then be passed on to the consumer in the form of price discounts, thereby creating even more volume
in terms of both basket size and visit frequency. Launching yourself into this upward virtuous spiral is an
essential ingredient of success for a discount retailer.
• Substitutes: moderate
A number of substitutes are available for consumers, principally from retailers having different formats:
food-supermarkets, local grocery stores, department stores, specialty stores, etc. Generally speaking,
these other formats offer more convenience at higher prices. Discount retailers have to keep track that
their price discounts remain sufficiently large to justify the extra effort for consumers to come to them.
An interesting second substitute is the direct sales channel. Manufacturers like Dell who sell
directly to the consumer may be a growing rival for discount retailers. As consumers become more used
to purchasing relatively large items over the internet (the sort of items for which the price savings offered
4
by a discount retailer would have justified the effort of making the trip), online sellers will be an
increasing threat to the traditional discount retailers. However, of course, none of these online sellers
can offer the one-stop convenience of a discount retailer: none of them will be able to offer a comparable
range of products in the immediate future.
• Barriers to entry: high
As explained above, volume is essential to survive as a discount retailer. A new entrant must achieve
substantial market share to reach minimum efficient scale. Ingredients for volume selling are (a) a
complex and expensive distribution network, (b) a base number of stores to justify the distribution
network, and (c) a data management system matching supply and demand. High capital expenditures are
therefore a prerequisite. Even if this money can be raised (which is unlikely given the overall
unattractiveness of the industry), there is a scarcity of desirable property, at least in the U.S.: the country
is already carpeted with large retail discount centers (Wal-mart itself has run out of space) and so it is hard
to find locations without head to head competition with one or more incumbents. As a result, incumbents
will almost inevitably retaliate and attempt to squeeze out the entrant through price wars (which the
entrant will lose because of its lack of economies of scale). (An additional reason for retaliation is the
large exit barriers for the current players created by the enormous amount of capital tied up for them in
their existing operations.)
3. What are Wal-Mart’s competitive advantages? Please clearly articulate how Wal-Mart activities
translate into competitive advantages, and to the extent possible, quantify these effects.
We believe that Wal-Mart has five distinct competitive advantages, which are set forth in the table below.
In each case, the activities that implement that competitive advantage are listed. Under fit and scope, we
list how we believe these activities implement the basic strategy of Wal-Mart described in Section 1 (low
cost, high volume, customer satisfaction). It can be seen that the competitive advantages always fit with
the strategy and are also mutually supportive.
Competitive
Advantage
Activities Fit and Scope Trade-Offs
Distribution
capabilities1
Efficient distribution;
e.g. cross-docking,
predominance of Walmart’s
own distribution
centers, and “inside-out”
location strategy
- Economies of scale match
volume-based strategy
- Cost savings from lower inventory
levels
- Cost-savings can translate into
lower prices and more customer
satisfaction
- Expense
- Requires partnership
relationship with suppliers
- Requires sophisticated
IT
Partnership
relationship
Wal-Mart integrates
suppliers via IT and
- Improves supply chain and lowers
distribution costs
- Relatively high cost of
goods sold
1 One could argue that Wal-Mart’s distribution capabilities are not a competitive advantage, though merely an
activity that, for now, is being executed better than that of its competitors
5
with
suppliers
treats them well in terms
of pricing; they are more
partners than “value
takers”
- Additional cost savings from
elimination of manufacturer reps
- Requires integrated IT
- Access to sales and
inventory info for third
parties
Advanced
data-mining
Active collection and
usage of customer
purchase behavior info
- Useful data for suppliers
- Improves customer satisfaction
through more accurate forecasting
of demand
- Lower costs through reduced
inventory and shrinkage
- Improved matching of supply and
demand creates superior sales/ sq ft
Expense and time
Workforce
culture
Customer-oriented
workforce motivated
through generous
monetary participation
and belief in Wal-Mart
culture
- Good customer service is not
compromised by self-service and
low cost structure, thereby
improving customer loyalty
- Stores can respond more quickly/
flexibly to changing demand
- Continuous improvement mindset
- Expensive in terms of
benefits (profit sharing)
- Requires strong
corporate culture (need
proxy for Sam Walton)
- Requires employee
enablement from
sophisticated IT
(employees are hired with
little educational
background)
EDLP2 Maintenance of “every
day low prices”
- Improves customer satisfaction
through low prices
- Matches volume-driven strategy
- Drives down costs through less
advertising
- Steady prices improve stability of
supply chain
- Only possible so long as
you really have the lowest
prices
To supplement the qualitative analysis below, we have analyzed Wal-Mart’s cost structure vs. the
competition in the chart below:
- 1993: cost structure (%of sales)
93,2
-4,4
-0,3
+0,2
-1,1
-0,6 -0,3
+2,3
97,4
90
92
94
96
98
100
102
Industry
average
COGS diff
Advertsing
exp
Rent
Inbound
log
IT costs
Shrinkage
Other
operating
Wal-Mart
6
What the chart shows is that Wal-Mart overall has a 4.2% cost advantage over its average competitor
(based on percentages of net sales), which breaks down as follows:
􀂃 COGS are actually higher at Wal-Mart. This is consistent with Wal-Mart’s partnership relations
with suppliers that are aimed not at squeezing suppliers but at producing cost reductions in distribution
from improved cooperation and IT integration.
􀂃 Advertising expenses are lower given the EDLP strategy: no promotion folders need to be
composed and distributed. In addition Wal-Mart probably realizes economies of scale through nation-wide
TV advertising.
􀂃 Rent per square meter is actually higher for Wal-Mart ($8,8/sq.ft. vs. $4,4/sq.ft) though this better
locations apparently pay-off as Wal-Mart has lower rent expenses as % of sales.
􀂃 Inbound logistics: Cross-docking and other distribution improvements result in cost savings of
1.1% of net sales.
􀂃 IT costs are higher than those of Wal-Mart’s competitors. However, these additional costs are
offset by benefits on many fronts: (a) higher sales/sq.ft through better forecasting of demand, (b) (b) lower
supply chain costs through integration with suppliers, (c) more effective communication both internally
and externally, and (d) lower shrinkage costs (due to improved tracing)
A portion of the cost savings, which the chart above identifies as “other operating costs” remain
unallocable to specific categories. We believe that these additional cost savings are principally due to
economies of scale in Wal-Mart’s distribution system that simply dwarfs those of its competitors. In
addition, we suspect that staffing at Wal-Mart stores is leaner than those of its competitors, so that
employee costs are relatively low at Wal-Mart (on a per square foot basis), even taking into account the
generous benefit schemes.
The costs do not tell the complete story. A sales/sq.ft. comparison shows that the combination of its
competitive advantages lead to higher sales ratios. We believe that this is merely the result of (a) its low
prices, (b) its corporate culture, and (c) its insight in purchasing behavior that allows them to eliminate
bad-selling sku’s.
2 We consider ADLP as a competitive advantage as Wal-Mart is the only player able to offer lower prices than
competition in a sustainable matter (or in other words: without going bankrupt)
7
- 1993 : Sales/sq.ft. Comparison -
289
105
211
179
144
385
681
535
374
332
397
595
228
248
357
500
Wal-Mart
Kmart
Target
Caldor
Arnes
Sam's club
Price Club
Costco
Pace
BJ's wholesale
club
Meijer
Wal-Mart
Fred Meyer
Smitty's
Bigg's
Average
supermarket
Discount Departments stores
Warehouse clubs
Supercenter
4. How sustainable are those advantages in the U.S.?
The advantages are sustainable in the U.S.
Distribution capabilities. Wal-Mart’s distribution system is already in place. It is massive and very
difficult to replicate by competitors, in particular when you consider the electronic linkage of sales and
inventory information all around the country.
Partnership relationship with suppliers. The supplier partnerships also constitute a sustainable
advantage. This relationship is something that evolves over time and the more time that passes, the higher
the level of integration. Wal-Mart has already demonstrated its commitment and seriousness in their
operations so the relationships should prosper even more over time. Other competitors will lack the
volume of purchases that Wal-Mart can offer and will lack the years of relationship that Wal-Mart already
has with their suppliers. In addition, Wal-Mart beats the other discount retailers on compensation paid to
suppliers because it reaps cost savings in the operations area (as discussed above).
Advanced data-mining. Wal-Mart’s IT systems are very advanced and even though their competitors
will continue to copy them, they are always one step behind. The company has developed expertise in this
issue so it is able to constantly upgrade their systems. However, one would expect Wal-Mart’s
competitive advantage in this area to shrink over time.
Workforce culture. The advantage of having motivated and proactive employees can be replicated by
others, but it is not an overnight thing. Wal-Mart has created a corporate culture that is considered one of
the best in the U.S. and “matching” this by their competitors will take time. Creating a culture is an
everyday effort on the part of management and it involves careful focus on the interactions that occur in
the company. It is impossible for another discounter to replicate Wal Marts culture exactly but they can
follow the same idea. However, it is difficult to match the “best working place in the U.S.”
EDLP. You cannot replicate EDLP unless you can actually offer consistently low prices. Competitors
can only do this to the extent they are able to match Wal-Mart on cost. Given the other competitive
8
advantages of Wal-Mart that reduce its costs (IT and distribution), it is hard to imagine another
competitor matching Wal-Mart’s EDLP.
5. How transferable are those advantages as Wal-Mart moves into new formats and especially into
new international locations?
(A) New formats. Currently, Wal-Mart is considering “neighborhood stores” as a new format.
Accordingly we have used that format to analyze the transferability of Wal-Mart’s competitive
advantages.
Advanced data mining. Wal-Mart’s IT capabilities can be easily adapted. Wal-Mart’s assortment
will be different in other formats, customer demand will be different, but all this will be easily manageable
by Wal-Mart’s existing IT.
EDLP. We have some doubt whether Wal-Mart’s cost structure for this new format will be good
enough to support EDLP for the new format. In particular, we expect rental costs/ sq ft to be higher given
the urban locations. Urban locations also create higher distribution costs (more frequent, smaller
deliveries, delivery problems due to traffic congestion). However, Wal-Mart may be able to partially
offset some of these costs through reduced inventory costs resulting from high inventory turnover
Workforce culture. The corporate culture can be transferred easily to new formats. New
employees are no harder to socialize at neighborhood stores than at supercenters.
Distribution capability. The neighborhood stores can benefit from the existing distribution
system. In fact, locations are chosen so that neighborhood stores can be served as part of runs to
supercenters. This is probably the biggest plus for the new format: the increased volume will generate
cost savings in distribution for both the existing formats and the new neighborhood stores.
Partnership relationship with vendors. The neighborhood market will use the current suppliers;
there are no transfer issues.
Our main concern about the neighborhood stores is therefore whether the same economics of the
successful supercenters are transferable to any new formats. The table below summarizes our concerns for
the neighborhood markets.
2002 Supercenter economics Neighborhood markets
# sg.ft. 180.000 45.000
Sales/sq.ft 366 422
Total sales($)/store 65.825.699 18.990.000
% COGS 75,10% 84%
Operating expenses 18,10% 18,10%
Operating profit (%) 6,80% -2,10%
Operating profit($)/sq.ft. 24,9 -8,9
The table shows that COGS represent 84% of sales, which leads to a 16% gross margin for
neighborhood markets (assuming the same price levels as Supercenters). Even assuming the same
9
operating expenses for neighborhood stores as for Supercenters, which is a generous assumption for the
neighborhood stores, we notice that the neighborhood markets would run at a loss3. The high COGS and
lower gross margin, we believe, reflect the fact that the product mix is more oriented towards food.
The table below summarizes the succesfactors of the supercenter format. Gross profit can be expressed as
(# of customers) x (visiting frequency) * (average $ in shopping basket) * average gross margin. Each
format adds to the successful mix of the supercenter:
FOOD (grocery supermarket) NON-FOOD (General Merchandise discount store)
- Visiting frequency: the frequency visit is high (weekly
or bi-weekly) because supercenters offer food, and
Americans have the habit of weekly stocking the majority
of their food items
- # of customers: the # of potential supercenter
customers is high given the high geographic span of
the format
- The average $ in shopping basket is high. The trip
to the supercenter is done to fill the basement with
food, but also to buy non-food items.
- The gross margin is relatively high: whereas food
drives traffic, general merchandise drives profit. The
floorplan shows that the food and non-food sections
are nicely separated to allow for a quick visit (instore-
time-consumption is one of the drawbacks of
large supercenters). Though the intermediary section
between food and nonfood will typically be filled
with cheap non-food items to draw the customer into
the moneymaking non-food part of the supercenter.
Overall we now understand why supercenters are such money machines: the non-food section provides the
customer span and profit; the food section provides the frequency and low price image. In conclusion we
summarize that the competitive advantages are transferable, but that Wal-Mart should carefully consider
its price-level and assortment to make new formats profitable.
(B) Current formats in other countries.
Expanding the existing formats to other countries is intuitively appealing. A low cost volumebased
strategy offering superior customer satisfaction seems appealing anywhere we can identify a
sizeable middle class (or aspiring middle class) and decent population growth. Though when reviewing
the competitive advantages, one notices that Wal-Mart might prefer a mature and developed retail market
to realize its low-cost advantage on the one hand, but an underdeveloped, emerging slowly growing retail
market to have time to grow corporate culture perspective.
• Advanced data mining / customer insight
Technology advancement and trained employees are the key requirements for implementing the IT system
abroad. Though this is not a barrier to overcome, shopping and consumption habits differ across most
3 However, one should not jump to conclusions: (a) overall operating expenses can go down due to the economies
of scale (b) marginal distribution costs for the neighborhood stores are low as they are supplied on trips to
supercenters (c) prices will be higher at neighborhood markets given the added convenience of their location.
10
countries making it hard to build on the US data. Mature retail countries as Western Europe are
preferable over emerging modern-retail countries as China given (a) the countries’ availability of
technology/infrastructure and (b) its similar consumption habits to the US.
• EDLP
Despite the fact that Wal-Mart is the inventor, we see different retailers in different countries adopting an
EDLP strategy. We see little problem in copying this part of the strategy.
• Customer oriented workforce
The corporate culture is related to a number of factors:
- The entry strategy: if Wal-Mart grows organically in a new country, it can build its own corporate
culture. Though when it acquires a retailer, it has to convert the existing corporate culture, which
has proven to be difficult.
On the other side organic growth in an emerging country brings the major disadvantage that
volume grows slowly which limits the economies of scale.
- The culture of the country: the Wal-Mart culture is atypical and not all workforces might cope
with it given their nation’s culture
- The role of the partner: most retailers enter a new country through a partnership to increase the rate
of success. This requires a mutual understanding and a fit between the two corporate cultures to
work together effectively
In conclusion we see that organic growth is the preferred option to build a similar customer oriented
workforce. Though this may not be trivial if Wal-Mart needs to acquire volume fast.
• Distribution capability
The distribution network has to be build from scratch in a new country. This limits the optimal choice of a
target country:
- In order to get the competitive cost advantage, volume is needed. This means that acquisition is a
preferred tool from a cost perspective.
- A decent infrastructure is needed so all goods can be transported efficiently
- The country is preferably large so economies of scale can be attained. That means similar
assortments, and therefore similar consumer tastes, across large regions
So from a distribution point of view, a large developed retail market is the preferred choice.
• Partnership relationship with vendors
Wal-Mart can work with the same suppliers in other countries to the extent that:
- The assortment is affordable to the population and fits with the local taste. In clear terms this
means that western countries are preferable
11
- The supplier is present in these other countries and/or has the financial power to develop itself in
these countries.
This means that from a supplier’s perspective, mature western oriented countries are preferable.
• Economics of the format
We already explained the economics of the supercenter format. This format has to fit with local
purchasing habits:
- Weekly stocking of items: Japanese consumers do not have the habit of stocking items on a weekly
basis. Wal-Mart’s existing formats as the supercenter may therefore clash with the local shopping
habits
- Mobile population: the population has to be mobile, willing to travel to the Wal-Mart’s large stores
and able to transport large quantities of goods easily home. This may not be trivial: imagine
carrying 20 bags home using Singapore’s MRT.
Conclusion: we see that transferring the different competitive advantages puts different and sometimes
conflicting requirements on the country that Wal-Mart wants to enter. This is in line with their experience:
when acquiring the Wertkauf retail chain, they had large difficulties in converting the existing corporate
culture towards the customer-oriented culture (it took a while before German employees wanted to open
the day with shouting in group: “the customer is the king!”).
6. Attractive growth options for Wal-Mart.
(1) Continue converting discount formats to supercenters: we illustrated the success of the
supercenter format. Overall, we believe it will be difficult for Wal-Mart to find a similar golden egg
amongst its alternatives. Therefore it should pursue converting discount formats to supercenters to the
extent this is possible.
(2) New product categories and services. First, Wal-Mart can move up in the quality of its
products. Wal-Mart’s experience in the UK shows that consumer perceptions can be altered from a focus
on low-cost to providing high quality at value prices. Expanding its own higher-quality brands, such as the
‘George’ apparel line and increasing the selection of known brands (Levi Strauss jeans, etc.) are ways to
implement this strategy. Second, Wal-Mart can further expand its one-stop-solution by offering more
store-in-store specialty stores. For example, in 2002 Wal-Mart began to offer PC fix centers, but it can go
far beyond that to areas such as financial services (including residential brokerage), insurance, banking
and credit, entertainment, home and garden improvement, etc. All of these moves can drive improved
margins and, in the case of new services, create entirely new revenue sources. However, we are skeptical
about whether this is the right move for Wal-Mart. It is, at heart, a high-volume, low-cost retailer. If its
existing strategy were not working, it might be worth doing something else.
12
New store formats. Our concern with new formats is the preservation of Wal-Mart’s cost
structure and the profitable format economics. As discussed above in the context of the neighborhood
stores, all competitive advantages are transferable into other formats with the possible exception of EDLP;
so because of these synergies incremental investments stay relatively limited. Though Wal-Mart should
only do this to the extent they can assure making profits with these formats.
Internationalization. At some point in the not so distant future, Wal-Mart’s highest growth will be
generated in the international arena. It is our view that this is the most promising opportunity for Wal-
Mart. As discussed above in Section 5B, the overall strategy for Wal-Mart makes sense in other countries
too and for the most part Wal-Mart’s competitive advantages can be transferred abroad. It is therefore not
surprising that the number of Wal-Mart stores outside the U.S. has almost doubles to 1200 (compared to
1647 in the United States) in the past four years. Though we should also emphasize that some markets as
South Korea, China, and Japan have been less successful because of reasons we indicated: volume did not
come instantaneously because of the early stage of development of the retail market, local partnerships did
not fit Wal-Mart’s own culture, differences exist in consumer preferences requiring totally different
assortments, the countries’ infrastructure was rather underdeveloped, etc. Though we see that in more
developed and more western-like retail markets, Wal-Mart (despite some initial growing pains)
successfully gained market share and attained profitability.

Walmart Retailer business in India


In November of 1962 Mr. Sam Walton was opened Wal-Mart. It is largest retail store chain in America. Wal-Mart itself has a big brand and the market leader of Retail sector in US. Wal-Mart employs 1.6 million associates worldwide in more than 3,700 stores in the US and more than 1,500 throughout the rest of the world. Strategy of Wal-Mart is the low price. Wal-Mart outlets is spread throughout the world and doing well.
Vision Statement:-
“Our vision is to provide good quality and services to our customers,while remaining the market leader and striving daily to be the most admired company”.
Mission Statement:-
“To provide quality products at an everyday low price and with extended Customer service…always.”
Wal-Mart Slogan: - “Save money, live better”

The culture consists of Wal-Mart:-
• Quality product at low prices “everyday”
• Respect for the individual.
• Service to our customers.
• Strive for excellence.


Divisions of Wal-Mart-
• Neighborhood Markets (groceries)
• Sam’s Club (membership)
• Discount stores (FMCG& apparels)
• Wal-Mart super centers (groceries)
• McLane (Acquired just now)

Divisions Discount stores supercenters Sam’s club Neighbour-hood markets
International Totals 942 238 71 37





SWOT of Wal-Mart:-


Competitive Advantage of Wal-Mart-
1. Supply Chain Management: -
This is one of the best competitive advantages. Wal-Mart has two main supplier P&G and HUL. The supply chains add the value to the company.

2. Price Leadership: -
Wal-Mart always sells product on low price and they forward this benefits to their customers.

3. Exchange benefit: -
The Wal-Mart customer can exchange their purchased product through any Wal-Mart outlets.

4. Brand Image:-
The strongest competencies of Wal-Mart are there brand image in the minds of consumer. It is the leader of the world retail industry.




RETAIL INDUSTRY IN INDIA

Retail industry is one of the largest growing industries in India. In India it has economy of 13% GDP. India has uppermost number of outlets per person and it is 7 per thousand. Retail sector has over 14 million outlets operates in India. Indian retail space per capita at 2 sq. ft. / person is lowest in the world and Indian retail thickness of 6 percent is highest in the world.  India has an annual income of over  45 lakh from 1.8 million households.
The retail industry is divided into two sectors; the first is organized and second unorganized sectors.
a)Organized sector:-
It mostly target market is urban area and their target customeris high income and middle class.
eg:- Hypermarkets, Retail chains, supermarket and Retail outlets etc.,
b)Unorganized Sector:-
It refers to the conventional formats of low-cost vending. It is mostly run by localities in their respective regions. Its target market is rural areas and semi-urban regions and their Targeted customer is middle and lower middle class.
eg:- Local Kirana shops, general stores, street vendors etc.,



India Retail Facts
• Total Retail: Rs.2,000,000 crore (Rs.20,000 billion)
• Modern retail size: Rs.1,64,000 crore (Rs.1,640 billion): 8.2 per cent of total retail
• Employment in modern retail: 10 direct employment in retail and 100 indirect employment per Rs.1 crore (Rs.10 million) sales
• Total employment in modern retail: 1.65 million
• Estimated indirect employment in modern retail: 1.65crore
• Dependence on modern retail: Over 1.8 Crore  people
The retail industry in India is anticipated to twice in worth from US$ 330 billion in 2007 to $640 billion by 2015. Actually, India has topped AT Kearney's annual Global Retail Development Index (GRDI) for the third year in a row as the most attractive market for retail investment.     (AT Kearney GRDI ranks the top 30 emerging countries for retail development and identifies windows of opportunity for global retailers to invest in developing markets)
There are many mergers and takeovers going on in recent time Wal-Mart acquired McLane. It is trying to expand business in Asian continent mostly in India. Indian competitors in Retail industry are Kirana stores, Pantaloon, K Raheja corp. group, Trent, Landmark, A V Birla group, etc.                                                                      
Analysts believe the sector is likely to show significant growth of over 9 % p.a over the next 10 years and also see rapid development in organized retail formats, with the proportion likely to reach a more respectable 25% by 2018.


Michael Porter’s Five Forces Analysis ofIndian Retail Industry:-

 

Threats for New Entrants:-(Force is Moderate)
One of the defining characteristics of competitive advantage is the industry’s barrier to entry. Retail industries with high barriers to entry are usually too expensive for new firms to enter like infrastructure, employees, huge capital investment. Industries with low barriers to entry are relatively cheap for new firms to enter.

The threat of new entrants rises as the barrier to entry is reduced in a marketplace. As more firms enter a market, will see rivalry increase, and profitability will fall to the point, where there is no incentive for new firms to enter the industry.




Here are some common barriers to entry:
• High cost of entry –
New entrants will require huge capital, infrastructure, labour to enter in Indian retail industry.
• Brand loyalty –
When brand loyalty is strong within an industry, it can be difficult and expensive to enter the market.
• Government Policy-
Government new retail policy constrainnew foreign retailers those policies are:
Said location must have population more than 10 lakh.
Said company has to invest more than 5 million dollar for said outlet.
Said company has to employ local unskilled labours.

• Distribution Channels-

New entrant will get problem through existing distribution channel of market, while entering in India.

• Economies of scale-

Logistic is strongest distinctive point of any company. When company produce more quantity it can reduce cost. It helps to provide low price product to the consumer with high in profit with low cost. It requires high economies of scale.

Determinants ofBuyer Power :-(Force is High)

There are two types of buyer power in retail. The first is related to the customer’s price sensitivity. If each brand of a product is similar to all the others, then the buyer will base the purchase decision mainly on price. This will increase the competitive rivalry, resulting in lower prices, and lower profitability.

The other type of buyer power relates to negotiating power. Large quantity buyers tend to have more influence with the firm, and can negotiate lower prices.




Some factors affecting buyer power are:

Size of buyer – Larger quantity buyers will have more power over suppliers in retail industry.

Number of buyers –

When there are a small number of buyers, they will tend to have more power over suppliers. The Department of Defense is an example of a single buyer with a lot of power over suppliers.


Purchase quantity and quality –

Indian consumer can buy high quantity of product, if there will low price of product, because of the low price factors consumer will neglect quality factor.

Indian consumer’s mentality-
Mostly Rural Indian consumers buy products form local suppliers (Kirana stores) and urban consumers prefer both sources of supplier.
Discount factor-
It makes the consumer to buy product through internet from different companies with different types of discount like gift, cash discount etc.

Threats of Substitute Industry and products-(Force is Moderate)

This is probably the most overlooked, and therefore most damaging, element of strategic decision making. It’s vital that business owners  not only look at what the company’s direct competitors are doing, but what other types of products people could buy instead.

When switching costs (the costs a customer incurs to switch to a new product) are low the threat of substitutes is high. As is the case when dealing with new entrants in retail, companies may aggressively price their products to keep people from switching. When the threat of substitutes is high in retail, profit margins will tend to be low. Indian consumers have plenty of choices of products to buy, so industry get benefits through variety of products.
The quality of substitute products makes influence on consumer buying decision and also location, culture, social, philological influence.


Determinants of supplier power-(Force is Moderate)
When multiple suppliers are producing a commoditized product in retail industry, the company will make its purchase decision based mainly on price, which tends to lower costs. On the other hand, if a single supplier is producing something the company has to have, the company will have little leverage to negotiate a better price.
Size plays a factor here as well. If the retail company is much larger than its suppliers, and purchases in large quantities, then the supplier will have very little power to negotiate.

A few factors that determine supplier power include:

Supplier concentration –

The fewer the number of suppliers for a products in retail, the more power they will have over the retailers. This is a real life situation.

Switching costs –

Suppliers of retail stores become more powerful as the cost to change to another supplier increases.

Uniqueness of product –

Suppliers that produce products specifically for a retailers and retailers will have more power than product suppliers.

Competitors-(Force is Moderate but Increasing)
Competitors are competitors within an industry. Competition in the industry can be weak, with few competitors that don’t compete very aggressively. Or it can be intense, with many competitors fighting in a cut-throat environment.
Key Players in Indian Retail Sector-
• Kirana Stores-

This is the oldest and recognized format of unorganized retail, which has 97% of market coverage. It is the main competitor for every retailer and other retail sector players in India. Till now people of India prefer Kirana stores to buy daily goods. It has somehow brand loyalty of consumer and it is located at very convenient places.

• AV Birla Group -
It has a strong presence in apparel retail and owns renowned brands like Allen Solly, Louis Phillipe, Trouser Town, Van Heusen and Peter England. The company has investment plans to the tune of 8000 – 9000 crores till 2010. It has started to expand aggressively to compete with other players.
• Trent -
Itis a subsidiary of the Tata groupit operates lifestyle retail chain, book and music retail chain, consumer electronics chain etc. Westside, the lifestyle retail chain registered a turnover of 3.58 mn in 2006. Trent become famous in short span of time.
• Landmark Group -
It invested 300 crores to expand Max chain, and 100 crores on Citymax 3 star hotel chain. Lifestyle International is their international brand business.
• K Raheja Corp Group -
It has a turnover of 6.75 billion which is cross US$100 million mark by 2010. Segments include books, music and gifts, apparel, entertainment etc.
• Reliance–
It has more than 300 Reliance Fresh stores; they have multiple formats and their sale is expected to be 90,000 crores by 2009-10.
• Pantaloon-
Retail has 450 stores across the country and revenue of over 20 billion and is touched 30 million by 2010. Segments include Food & grocery, e-tailing, home solutions, consumer electronics, entertainment, shoes, books, music & gifts, health & beauty care services. This is the biggest competitor for new retailer coming to India.

It’s important to analyze these five forces and their effect on companies who want to invest in. The Porter Five Forces Analysis will give a good explanation for the profitability of an industry, and the firms within it. Porter’s five forces make a big difference in company’s success and failure.This give the clear idea about India present retail industry, it will be easier to plan strategy to make impact in Indian retail industry.


P.E.S.T.L.E Analysis of Indian Retail Industry:-
Political Analysis:-
• Strong opposition to FDI in India’s retail sector.
• Taxation policy – VAT.
• Low access to banking facilities.
Economic Analysis:-
• GDP Growth.
• Foreign Investments.
• Money Supply.
• Inflation.
Social Analysis:-
• Corporate Social Responsibility.
• Environmental Safety.
• Ease of shopping.
Technological Analysis:-
• Online Shopping.
• Retail media networks(RMN).
• ERP System.
• CRM System.
Legal Analysis:-
• Wages act.
• Weights and measure, octroi etc.
• Shop and establishment act.
Environmental Analysis:-
• Seasonal products.
• Product life cycle.

Retail Industry Attractiveness study:-
a) These are the several characteristic to determine market attractiveness:

1. Market growth:-
The business monitor international India retail report for the fourth-quarter for 2011 that total sales will grow from US $ 411.28 billion in 2011 to US$ billion by 2015.

2. Market Size:-
Indian retail sector is divided in to two groups one is organised group and other one is unorganised .In that only 3% retail market is organised and remaining 97%is unorganised so there is huge scope for growth and expansion in Indian retail sector.

3. Market profitability:-
Probability in Indian market is moderate. Competitions from both unorganised and organised sector have effect on probability. Higher the competition lowers the profits.

4. Segmentation:-
As a part of organised sector Wal-Mart targeted an urban area, middle class or higher middle class consumer with high income level. Mostly youngster and Indian housewife will prefer shops like Wal-Mart.

5. Distribution Channels:-
Distribution channels are direct, wholesale. Wal-Mart will have to apply both distribution channels for consumers. It has also world best supply chain management and IT facilities.
It will become convenient for Indian consumer and will be easily available.

b) Opprtunity in Indian Retail Market:-
• Overall Indian retail market is about 206 billion dollar and has 5% annual growth.
• Scope for a growth in Indian retail market is 97%.
• India has emergence of middle class  and consumer.
• About 60% of Indian population is in age group of 20-30 and youth are more declined towards the modern shopping.
• Mostly Indian consumers are price conscious, so wall mart strategy “Everyday Low Price” and wide range of products will attract Indian consumers.


Recommendation:-
India is one of the largest growing retail industries and there is so much scope for new entrants in this market. The increase number of buying power of Indian middle class opens doors for new players to make the market attractive and profitable. If Wal-Mart use this planned strategy to make entry in Indian market, it will help them to establish and make sustainable business.
Indian retail  law does not allow multi-brand foreign retailers to sell directly to consumers So Wal-Mart will have to make 51:49 joint ventures with any Indian company to enter in Indian market.
According to me Wal-Mart must enter in Indian retail industry, there is so much scope for such companies.Wal-Mart competitive advantages matches to the Indian consumer, which is a positive reason to enter in India. It will become milestone for Wal-Mart in South Asia.

Bibliography and References:

• www.wikipedia.com
• www.google.com
• www.authorstream.com
• www.slideshare.com
• www.walmart.com
• timesofindia.indiatimes.com › Topics › Wal-Mart

WALMART SUCCESS IN MEXICO, CANADA AND CHINA: GLOBAL EXPANSION, STRATEGIES, ENTRY MODES, THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

ABSTRACT

Global expansion has been gaining a lot of attention. There are many important factors to be considered in the decision-making process such as business strategies, entry modes, and threats and opportunities in the markets. Appropriate strategies will minimize the risk of failure in international markets. The right business strategies and entry modes employed will increase the firm’s chances of success and influence the future of the retailer.
Key words: global expansion, business strategies, entry modes, threats, opportunities, Walmart

1. Introduction

The internalization of the retail industry has been researched widely, and majority of these studies have described the motivations and scales for international expansion by retailers (Akehurst & Alexander, 1995; Williams, 1992). Many models of internalization explains the sequence of foreign expansion, showing that companies who go international will do better in foreign markets that are similar to their domestic markets. This was why Walmart chose to enter the markets of Canada and Mexico (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). There are several reasons why international retailing became popular. Some of these reasons are, the domestic market is saturated, and there is a need for larger diverse investments, economic pressures, and external and internal forces that compel retailers to enter new markets. It is therefore important for the retailer to choose the right market entry strategy into the international markets (Sternquist, 2007). Several research studies have concluded that retailers can minimize the risks of entering new markets by choosing markets similar to the domestic market from the aspects of cultural, geographical and growth potentials. (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Welch & Welch, 1996).
Walmart was established in 1962 by Sam Walton. Walmart got its name from the family name Walton, giving Walmart the meaning of Walton’s mart in long form. Walmart is a strong company, having survived the 2008 recession in the United States. Walmart registered annual increased sales and market growth. For a fast growing retailer like Walmart, best entry modes are needed to enter a new market (Fred, 2011).
2. Global expansion

Global retail expansion has attracted many large-sized companies with targets to increase business profits and market share. Global expansion not only attracts large organizations but also small to medium-sized companies, companies new to international expansion, as well as those who are already expanding in the international arena. The success achieved by newer specialty retailers in the international market such as Zara (Spain), H&M (Sweden), and Shanghai Tang (Hong Kong) have motivated and paved the way for other organizations to follow. However, there are also well-known retailers who failed in their expansion in certain global markets due to regulatory, legal and cultural challenges, competition, and attempting to change local shopping behavior (Cox, 2011). Retailers who operate only in neighboring markets, or those geographically located close to their home markets will expect to face a lower level of such risks (Burt, 1993; Davis, Desai, & Francis, 2000; Hollander, 1970: Knee, 1993; Robinson & Clarke-Hill, 1990).
Top managers are also becoming more cautious in maintaining a common identity and culture in the process of trying to build up global enterprises (Joshua & Chi, 2007). Moreover, it is very tough for businesses to make decisions regarding the choice of markets for their business development because of the lack of accurate and reliable information. Domestic players in the markets will only portray the positive and potential side of the markets and hide the disadvantages, just to attract businesses into the market (Jackson, Houdard, & Highfield, 2008). 3


3. Comparison of business strategies used by Walmart in Mexico, Canada and China

Walmart used different strategies in Mexico, Canada and China. In Mexico, Walmart acquired Central American Retail Holding Co., which was struggling with accounting issues in 2006. After the acquisition, Walmart renamed the business Walmart Centroamérica. Central American Retail Holding Co. was previously the largest retailer in Central America. Walmart re-launched the whole chain of retail stores under the Central American Retail Holding Co. with wider product assortments and a lower pricing strategy. The lower pricing strategy was their basic strategy to expand Walmart’s philosophy, “Every Day Low Price” to all parts of the world (“Basic Strategy: 'Be More Walmart!',” 2011). Walmart’s main strategy in Mexico was the multi-format strategy whereby different groups of consumers could be served through meeting their various needs. Bodega Aurrera in Mexico is the company's fastest growing format. There are three versions of this store. Bodega Aurrera Express Stores consists of very small outlets serving urban areas such as Mexico City and Monterrey. Mi Bodega Aurrera is designed to serve rural towns and these stores were a great achievement for Walmart (“Multiple Formats Equal Flexibility,” 2011).
Walmart Canada created a new home branding effort that placed the Better Homes & Gardens license as the core for both hard and soft home categories (“Wal-Mart International Improves Game,” 2007). Every product offered has clear and obvious differences from their competitors, leaving strong impressions in the customers’ minds that these products originated from Walmart’s fashion and value chain (“Wal-Mart International Improves Game,” 2007). Walmart Canada also implemented Radio Frequency Identification Technology (RFID) in 20 stores and about 12 of their suppliers. The parent country in United States first practiced this technology to eliminate out-of-stock inventories. Walmart Canada focused on this to improve their supply chain and customer services. Stores equipped with this technology were able to use the system to track tagged items in the stores. This was an important achievement by Walmart Canada as it reduced errors in manual restocking methods, reduced over stocking in the stores, and reduced unnecessary transportation and ultimately a reduction in emissions of carbons (Mammarella, 2007). The success of Walmart was also seen through a large grocery insert in its Canadian discount stores called "Grocery Shelf" that provided a big return on capital at low risk (Orgel, 2005).
In China, Walmart’s objective was to be a national retail chain with no interrelated national distribution system. The mainland retail market had an estimated worth of US$750 billion in 2008. Therefore the gains were estimated to be huge if Walmart succeeded. The only challenge was the distribution system; the company had given in to union demands from the state-run, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, which represented an important climb down from Walmart’s anti-union US point of view (“Distribution critical to Wal-Mart China strategy,” 2006). However, Walmart was not influenced. The marketing strategies used by Walmart for BRIC and other developing countries still involved huge discounts and great values on all of their products, similar to strategies in their home country: maintaining low prices every day, especially middle-class customers, yet maintaining profits. According to JPMorgan and analyst Charles Grom, Walmart's main objective for future success was not to overdo Target in the United States. They also suggested Walmart worked on more interrelated marketing strategies and merchandising messages to serve their low end customers as well, instead on just focusing on middle-class customers (Frazier, 2007). Walmart in China was successful in using cost leadership, generating huge revenues. Therefore, Walmart continued with the cost leadership strategy and implemented the differentiation strategy (George, 2007).
4. Comparison of entry modes

Another reason for retailers to expand into the global markets was because the domestic market was highly saturated. For example, Sears, Kmart and Walmart’s most successful expansion was into Mexico and Canada. How do multinational retailers choose their entry mode into selected markets? Multinational retailers expanding into culturally diversified markets chose to have joint ventures with local retailers in the country to help them learn more about the country (Sternquist, 2007).
Walmart in Mexico penetrated the market with a joint venture with its local player, CIFRA, the largest retailer in Mexico. This joint venture helped Walmart gain better knowledge of the Mexican market. In Mexico, CIFRA supplied Walmart with supplier connections, knowledge about the local culture as well as 4

helping Walmart to work with local authorities. This ensured successful expansion of Walmart's power in the Mexican markets, gaining the greatest influence in the shortest time period. In return, Walmart transferred logistics knowledge to CIFRA, which also helped improve their local supply chain management. (Sternquist, 1997). Under Walmart’s agreement with CIFRA, Walmart opened membership warehouse clubs, known as Club Aurrera, which catered to small businesses and selected groups of consumers. The first Club Aurrera opened in Mexico City in December 1991. (“Global Push Begins in Mexico,” 2012). Besides that, CIFRA and Walmart also announced two joint ventures: a wholesale discount Aurrera stores, and an import-export company that provided CIFRA’s Mexican suppliers access to other Walmart outlets in the United States (Millman, 1991).
Walmart entered the Canadian markets through the entry mode of acquisition. In 1994, Walmart announced its entry into Canada with the purchase of 120 out of 142 Woolco Discount Stores located north of the border from the Woolworth Corporation. In 1993, the Woolco Stores had total sales of $1.14 billion (“Woolco Purchase Yields Entry Into Canada,” 2012). Walmart had avoided a time-consuming problem faced by other American retailers entering the Canadian market - that of building up stores. Walmart saved time through buying the established Woolco Stores, most which had floor space of 100,000 square feet or more, accompanied by strategic and attractive leases (“Woolco Purchase Yields Entry Into Canada,” 2012). In 2011, Walmart Canada announced that it had also completed another acquisition from Target Canada with a total of 39 store locations currently occupied by Zellers (“Canada Newswire,” 2011).
Most multinational enterprises has regarded market entry into China as not just an option for their business expansion, but also a strategic necessity for the future of their business. The economy in China is growing rapidly, supporting the whole population of 1.3 billion. China is expected to be a country with economic superpower with a very huge market in the 21st century (Schlevogt, 2000a, 2000b). On the other hand, Walmart is facing slow growth in the United States, and with these attractive and available options, Walmart aims to be the top player in the retail sector in China with its acquisition of Trust-Mart (Naughton, Schafer, Ansfield, & Lin, 2006). Other than using the acquisition strategy, Walmart also used the offshore sourcing strategy. Walmart sees China as a major production or assembly source country for their products the United States. This was their offshore sourcing strategy. Today, Walmart is the single largest export channel from Chinese manufacturers to the United States, with a record of at least 4% in China’s overseas sales (Goldstein, 2003). Interestingly, Walmart does not have any manufacturing plants in China and it does not have a direct control over the production process of its suppliers in China. Instead, the suppliers are those who take control and responsibility to meet certain levels of requirements, for example cost, quality and delivery (Shih, 2004). With this strategy, Walmart can hold to their “Everyday Low Price” philosophy. Walmart also utilized its strong bargaining position while maintaining a high level of ownership. Their selling strategy was to buy the products at a cheaper price from China, and reselling them at a higher price in the United States and other parts of the world. Therefore, Walmart maintained a high level of ownership control with its management control kept low (Goldstein, 2003).
5. Comparison of opportunities and threats

"Threat" and "opportunity" are two terms often used in strategic management in businesses (Mintzberg, Raisinghini, & Theoret, 1976; Nutt, 1984). These are often used to make strategic decisions and to evaluate their selected markets. The results and issues obtained from environmental analysis are categorized as threats and opportunities faced by the business (Christensen, Andrews, Bower, Hamermesh, & Porter, 1982).
a. Opportunities
i. Mexico

In 2007, Walmart de Mexico had made a huge investment of $1 billion dollars for new developments and they opened 136 new units from all its existing business formats. This development included the opening of new units of 57 Bodega Aurrera units, 16 Walmart Supercenters, 6 Sam's Clubs, 4 Superamas, 15 Suburbia 5

stores and 38 Vips and El Porton Restaurants. The new stores opened networks into the existing and new cities. The expansion into new cities increased the firm's coverage of new customers, and for the existing cities, Walmart had the advantage of dominating the market more widely. Besides that, the expansion of new stores helped increase the new customer base, resulting in higher sales (DATAMONITOR: Wal-Mart de Mexico., 2008). Consumers have changing preferences on where they buy their groceries and other daily products. They no longer prefer traditional retail; some now prefer larger and more standardized hypermarket and supermarket chains, and stores that offer lower and more attractive prices, as well as providing the convenience. In Mexico, the market share of the modern-format stores had increased almost 50% over years 2005 to 2010. This change in the customers’ preferences created an opportunity for Wal-Mart to expand its chains to more cities in Mexico (DATAMONITOR: Wal-Mart de Mexico., 2008).
ii. China

Walmart Stores has signed an agreement to acquire a little stake of Yihaodian.com, China’s largest online retailer. If the acquisition is successful, Walmart would have the chance to expand their business to the world of online shopping market, which would then generate more revenue. However, China’s anti-monopoly bureau considered the acquisition as excluding or restricting the competition of value-added telecommunications services market segments in China (“China approves Wal-Mart control of Yihaodian.,” 2012). Apart from Walmart having control of the services of Yihaodian.com, the latter could also use Walmart’s suppliers and logistics resources and system to track inventories (Mass Grocery Retail., 2012).
Another opportunity available for Walmart was the concept of discount store formats. Walmart could take the first step to start a discount store format expansion before the other retailers because the discount store format is now an attractive option in China. Walmart is the biggest retailer in China because of the acquisition of Trust-Mart's 100-outlet-strong hypermarket network. Therefore, Walmart has the opportunity to expand in China, by launching a new "discount compact hypermarket" format formed under Trust-Mart in China (Mass Grocery Retail., 2012).
iii. Canada

Walmart in Canada expanded its chain to the food retailing sector in Canada, since Target was a competitor to Walmart in Canada. Walmart had the competitive advantage over Target with involvement in the food retailing industry because Target is limited in food retailing (Orgel, 2011). Walmart Canada also had confirmed the retailer's planning of opening three supercenters in Québec, and Walmart ensured the quality of products they offer in the new store (Canada, 2011). Besides that, Walmart’s low price strategy had gave Walmart a great opportunity compared to other retailers in Canada, and this ensured Walmart’s path in Canada was stable (Swain, 1994). Another opportunity for Walmart in Canada was their decision to bring their warehouse club, Sam’s Club into Canada and it helped to increase Walmart’s popularity in the market (Robin, 2003).
b. Threats
i. Mexico

In February 2006, Mexico's retail association Asociacion Nacional de Tiendas de Autoservicio y Departamentales (ANTAD) sent many requests to the Congress to approve the proposals to upgrade the anti-monopoly laws to international standards. This affected Walmart de Mexico, because, if the laws were approved, Walmart de Mexico would lose its advantage of its better technology and larger size to offer the lowest prices in the market. Walmart Stores also faced this problem in the company's parent country in United States because, Walmart is a big retailer, and they were offering low prices and this affected smaller retailers to quit from the industry. In this case, Walmart de Mexico's expansion plans in Mexico was then affected by the laws and regulations in Mexico (DATAMONITOR: Wal-Mart de Mexico., 2008). 6

Other than that, another main issue that Walmart Mexico faced was the opposition towards their expansion in Mexico, mainly from the government and local retailer. A slow growing economy will cause a lower purchasing power in a country. The economy in Mexico was an important threat to Walmart because the slow growth in the Mexican economy affected the consumer spending and it affected Walmart's growth in Mexico (DATAMONITOR: Wal-Mart de Mexico., 2008). Besides that, the intense competition in Mexico will also be a threat for Walmart. In Mexico, Walmart is also facing a strong competition from Mexican supermarket chains because the retail industry in Mexico is saturated. Some examples of Walmart's strong international and domestic competitors were Organizacion Soriana, Controladora, Chedraui, and Gigante. These retailers had an intense competition with Walmart. The increasing competition from these retailers affected Walmart de Mexico, especially in terms of profitability (DATAMONITOR: Wal-Mart de Mexico., 2008).
ii. China

Walmart planned to expand bigger in China and the company had planned to open another ten stores throughout the urban areas. However, the effort faced some challenges, mainly from the government of China. China's state-controlled All-China Federation of Trade Union (ACFTU) had planned to take the action to sue Walmart as well as other non-Chinese companies if these companies did not have union branches in their Chinese operations. The main problem in this issue was that Walmart was well known for their anti-union stance. In order for them to survive in the market, Walmart had agreed to respect the choice of their employees in China who wanted to set up a union. This action may benefit China, but Walmart would have restrictions handling employee benefits and limited ways in resolving grievances. Even though there were many problems faced, as a multinational retailer, it was a must for Walmart to adapt to the specific markets they are operating in (“Wal-Mart: in union with China,” 2005).
iii. Canada

Walmart Canada’s largest threat will be the acquisition of Zellers Inc. by Target Corporation. The entry of Target Corporation will be another add-on to the intense competition of retailers in Canada. In the acquisition, Target took over 220 stores under Zellers, and this could impact Walmart as a big retailer because Target is growing fast after the acquisition (Orgel, 2011). The retail industry in Canada was very intense and saturated and the retail market was full of strong grocers and this would be a threat for Walmart because there would be more competition. This would slow down and eventually reduce Walmart's sales in Canada (Dunn, 2006). Besides that, Walmart also faced Canada’s regulatory threats and the legal challenges from Saint-Hyacinthe certification (Springer, 2005). Walmart also tried to introduce organic food, and this could be a threat to Walmart because of lack of a proper marketing strategy to market the product in their stores in Canada as there were other small-sized organic food suppliers which offered lower prices (Goodbaum, 2006).
6. Discussion

Walmart indeed has been a good example of a successful retailer that has successfully expanded and survived in the international markets. This had proved that there is potential for retailers in domestic markets to expand their business into the international arena through appropriate marketing strategies and entry modes. However, Walmart should also have sufficient information on the markets to overcome entry barriers. Walmart had been a successful retailer in the United States and today, and they are still growing across the world, mainly in United States, Canada and Mexico. Walmart used different types of marketing strategies and entry modes to dominate the markets, and this had given the large retailer a huge competitive advantage over other retailers in the market with the philosophy, “Every Day Low Price”, which had been successfully applied throughout the world. 7

Walmart’s choices of strategies in the Mexican, Canadian and China markets also portrayed the firm’s success in adapting to the country. Walmart in Mexico used the multi format strategy to set up different types of stores to satisfy majority needs and demands of the markets, and this helped Walmart to achieve a greater amount of concentration of customers. The Bodega Aurrera store chains were proof of the firm’s intelligence in dominating the market. These stores had different concepts such as discount stores and convenience stores that served different types of customers in different areas in Mexico. Secondly, in Canada, Walmart used the retail format development strategy to approach the market. Walmart in Canada extended their offerings into the home furniture sector where these furniture products were found only in Walmart. This had created brand awareness and brand loyalty towards Walmart. Besides that, Walmart made full use of their satellite communication system to frequently check on the inventories in Walmart stores to decrease shortage in supply. In Canada, Walmart have discount stores where these stores can generate high profits with low risks in the country. Thirdly, Walmart in China had achieved a huge success by using the cost leadership strategy in the country to attract more people. This is because of the growing population and economy in China that has helped Walmart to lower their prices and yield high volume sales.
Other than these successes, Walmart also used the appropriate entry modes to enter the markets. In Mexico, Walmart used the joint venture mode with Mexico’s largest retailer, CIFRA. This joint venture benefited Walmart as CIFRA provided the firm with information on the markets in Mexico, and Walmart saved time in the process of understanding the markets. This gave Walmart the advantage of a faster growth in the market. The strategy used by Walmart in Canada was the acquisition mode, where the firm took over the operations of Woolco, a weak retailer in the Canadian markets. With this acquisition, Walmart took over existing Woolco buildings. In China, Walmart used the offshore sourcing strategy together with the acquisition strategy where costs were reduced in finding new locations. From the different choices of entry modes that Walmart chose, all of the strategies were working well in different markets, where these strategies helped Walmart build a strong market base. Walmart has a huge potential expanding beyond its domestic market. With its strong market base, Walmart is well positioned to expand into other regions in the world. However, Walmart needs to heed the regulations of foreign markets, as well as the intensity of market competition.
7. Conclusion

Walmart’s decision to expand globally has been successful as seen in Walmart’s domination in the markets. Walmart’s success is a glorious story in the business world for being able to sustain their businesses not only domestically, but also globally. The business strategies and entry modes used were wisely chosen as they ensured profitability on a long term basis. Even though Walmart faced challenges in the foreign markets, they penetrated these markets successfully as they overtook their competitors in the retail industry. Walmart also demonstrated strong strategic management skills because Walmart chose their locations and targets countries carefully.
Walmart success can also be credited to their efforts in satisfying their customers from all social classes through offering a wide range of products using a low pricing strategy and attracting brand loyalty through repeat purchase. Another notable success was that the firm was able to survive the tough recession periods where the slower economy contracted business cycles, slowed down business growth and lifted unemployment rates. Notwithstanding, Walmart continued its business operations during the recession years and became a successful retailer in the industry beyond the borders.
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TMA03 Walmart around the world

9/24/2014

To what extent can Walmart’ s competitive advantages be transferred into international spheres?

Based in Bentonville, Arkansas, Walmart Stores, Inc. was founded in 1945 by Sam Walton and is now one of the largest retailers worldwide. It operates stores in a variety of formats, such as supermarkets, discount stores, warehouse clubs, and online properties. Its product offerings are wide-ranging: automotive accessories, food and beverages, cosmetics, clothing, and housewares. Walmart’s strategy is to be the low-cost leader among mass merchandisers. It operates on a scale unmatched by any of its competitors. To pursue its strategy, Walmart focuses on using advanced systems and technologies to reduce costs, improving relationships with suppliers by purchasing enormous quantities, and being a tough bargainer.

Competitive Advantages

Competitive advantage is anything that a company has, or does better, that customers value but the competition cannot match. The following sections discuss how Walmart uses its value chain throughout its primary activities to achieve its strategy and have a competitive advantage.

• Efficient Inbound and Outbound Logistics: Products from distributors and suppliers are transported to Walmart’s distribution centers via its large truck fleet transportation system and in case of perishables such as groceries are concerned, products are managed by Walmart’s suppliers’ inventory management systems connected directly to the store. Walmart also uses a technique known as “cross docking” whereby finished goods are taken straight from the supplier’s site, sorted, and delivered directly to the store. This leads to a reduction in the handling and storage of finished goods, resulting in fewer damaged goods and decreased staff needs. The efficiency of this system leads to a form of just-in-time inventory, allowing customers to control the supply of goods they want by their purchases.

Low cost strategy: Covering the traditional marketing four P’s of product, place, price, and promotion, Walmart uses these activities to support its low-cost strategy. At Walmart, customers buy products knowing that the store will deliver value in excess of its costs and that Walmart stands behind the goods it sells as a trustworthy merchandiser. In regards to price, Walmart has long implemented an everyday low price guarantee, reinforcing its motto of “Save Money. Live Better.” This motto supports its strategy because by guaranteeing the lowest price, Walmart reduces the expense and profit erosion caused by having to run frequent sales to move merchandise.
Store format and locations: Walmart’s store formats have long been central to its success, allowing it to maximize its attractiveness to a broad spectrum of customers. Its in-store layout makes for fast movement of product to the shelves and allows easy stocking. Walmart’s stock replenishment process is focused on managing the flow of goods through its stores, using a model it has led the development of—vendor- managed inventories. This enables Walmart to achieve higher levels of sales per square foot of floor space in comparison to most of its competitors. In determining where it places stores, Walmart uses a stringent set of criteria to select locations where it will have maximum market impact. Additionally, Walmart applies data mining and proprietary algorithms to determine where products are placed for maximum sales volume within its stores.

Systems and Technology: Walmart is one of the world’s leading companies in any retail sector at
developing and employing ways in which technology, both advanced and simple, can improve its operations. It supports and reinforces its low-cost strategy all along the value chain through its tightly integrated vendor and inventory management systems, to its use of satellite communications to track its truck fleet, to RFID tagging and advanced POS systems for merchandising operations in the store. It also uses low-tech, but highly effective, person-to-person and face-to-face communication practices.

Human Capital Management: Walmart has a unique way of linking its human capital management practice with its strategy all along its value chain. Interactions between the company and its associates are based on mutual respect, regular communication, high expectations, and clear incentives. Associates are not paid market-leading wages, thus reinforcing the company’s ability to keep its prices low for customers. But employees are compensated in other ways. They have access to desirable benefits such as profit sharing and health care, retirement, and company stock purchase plans. Employees have a surprisingly high degree of discretion and autonomy. The company has an open-door policy, and great promotion opportunities create a unique culture unusual in large retail organizations. This adds value throughout Walmart’s chain by sustaining a good working environment for associates and managers. Unusual but long-standing Saturday morning meetings are the trademark of the company’s management style.

Services: The central theme of Walmart services is the customer experience. Customers entering a store
are met by greeters wearing blue vests who create a welcoming and helpful experience. Throughout the store, price-check scanners allow customers to verify how much they will pay for their goods. Another beneficial service is Walmart’s “no questions asked” return policy. Its “sundown rule” states that employees will do their best to answer customer requests by the close of business on the day they are received. The “10-foot rule” is a customer service policy whereby associates greet nearby customers and ask if they can be of assistance. All these activities reinforce the customer experience Walmart seeks to achieve at the lowest costs.

Procurement: Walmart has developed a small number of highly efficient regional procurement centers.
Some of its largest suppliers, such as Proctor & Gamble, have set up satellite offices next to these centers to improve their ability to work with Walmart and manage its inventories while simultaneously reducing transaction and transportation costs. Walmart requires suppliers to cut their margins and meet its progressive employment policies, although it often assists them in doing so. These practices have enabled Walmart to buy its inputs at the lowest cost, avoid inventory holding costs, and offer lower-priced products that its customers value.

Application of Porter’s five forces Model to Walmart

Walmart’s competitiveness can also be interpreted in terms of Porter’s five forces model very well. Here we focus on Walmart’s position as a retail giant and competes with fellow retail chains or online stores such as K-mart, Target and Amazon.
Threat of New Entry: New entrants to an industry can raise the level of competition, thereby reducing its attractiveness. The threat of new entrants largely depends on the barriers to entry. For Walmart, Entry barriers are relatively high, as Walmart has an outstanding distribution systems, locations, brand name, and financial capital to fend off competitors. Walmart often has an absolute cost advantage over other competitors. Cost to build retail enterprise like Walmart is formidable.
The Threat of Substitutes: When it comes to this market, there are not many substitutes that offer convenience and low pricing. The customers has the choice of going to many specialty stores to get their desired products but are not going to find Walmart’s low pricing. Online shopping proves another alternative because it is so different and the customer can gain price advantages because the company does not necessarily have to have a brick and mortar store, passing the savings onto the consumer.
The Bargaining Power of Buyers: The individual buyer has little to no pressure on Walmart. Consumer advocate groups have complained about Walmart’s pricing techniques. Consumer could shop at a competitor who offers comparable products at comparable prices, but the convenience is lost.
The Bargaining Power of Suppliers: Some of the major suppliers of Walmart are: Gillette, Hewlett-Packard, Johnson & Johnson, Kimberly-Clark, Kraft Foods, Nestle, Purina Pet Care Company, Procter & Gamble and Unilever. Since Walmart holds so much of the market share, they offer a lot of business to manufacturers and wholesalers. This gives Walmart a lot of power because by Walmart threatening to switch to a different supplier would create a
scare tactic to the suppliers. Walmart could vertically integrate. Walmart does deal with some large suppliers like
Proctor & Gamble, Coca-Cola who has more bargaining power than small suppliers.
The Rivalry among the Existing Players: Currently, there are three main incumbent companies that exist in the same market as Walmart: Sears, K Mart, and Target. Target is the strongest of the three in relation to retail. Target has experienced tremendous growth in their domestic markets and have defined their niche quite effectively Sears and K-Mart seem to be drifting and have not challenged K-Mart in sometime. Mature industry life cycle.

Globalizing Walmart:

When Walmart began to expand internationally, it had to decide which countries to target. Although the European retail market was large, to succeed there Walmart would have had to take market share from established competitors. Instead, Walmart deliberately selected emerging markets as its starting point for international expansion. In Latin America, it targeted nations with large, growing populations – Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil – and in Asia it aimed at China.

Latin America:

For its first international store, opened in 1991 in Mexico City, the company used a 50-50 joint venture. This entry mode helped Walmart manage the substantial differences in culture and income between the United States and Mexico. Its Mexican partner, the retail conglomerate, Cifra, provided expertise in operating in the Mexican market and a base for learning about retailing in that country. Still, learning the dos and don’ts was a difficult process. In Mexico City, they built large parking lots at some of their Mexican stores, only to realize that many of their customers rode the bus to the store, they trudged across those large parking lots with bags full of merchandise. So they responded by creating bus shuttles to drop customers off at the door. These were all mistakes that were easy to address, but Walmart worked smarter internationally to avoid cultural and regional problems on the front end. After gaining experience with partners, in 1997 Walmart expanded further in Mexico by acquiring a controlling interest in Cifra, which it renamed in 2000 to Walmart de Mexico S.A. de C.V. By 2006, Walmart operated 808 units in Mexico in 30 states, achieving annual sales of %15.8 billion and employing over 130,000. IT accounts for over half of all super market sales in

Mexico.

When it entered Brazil in 1996, Walmart was able to leverage its learning from the Mexican experience to take a majority position in a 60-40 venture with a local retailer Lojas Americana. Walmart’s initial entry into Brazil used greenfield store sites and emphasized aggressive pricing to build market share, but the French retailer Carrefour and other Brazilian competitors retaliated, launching a costly price war. Walmart’s strength in international sourcing was initially of limited assistance in Brazil, since the leading sales category – food – was primarily sourced locally, where Carrefour and others already had strong relationships with local suppliers. Over time, Walmart changed its competitive emphasis to customer service and a broader merchandise mix than smaller local companies could match. The company also pursued acquisitions to supplement internal growth, buying 118 Bompreco stores in 2004 and 140 Sonae stores in 2005. By 2006, Walmart was the third-largest retailer in Brazil, operating 293 stores and employing 50,000 associates.

The Challenge of China

The lure of China, the world’s most populous nation, proved too great to ignore. Walmart was one of the first international retailers in China when it set up operations in 1996. Concerned about their potential impact on local firms, Beijing restricted the operations of foreign retailers. These restrictions included requirements for government – backed partners and limitations on the number and location of stores. Initially, Walmart partner was Charoen pokphand, a Thai conglomerate with massive investments in China and a strong track record with join ventures. This venture was terminated after 18 months, due to differences regarding control. A new venture was subsequently formed with two politically connected partners, Shenzhen Economic Development Zone and Shenzhen International Trust and Investment Corporation, and Walmart was able to negotiate a controlling stake in the venture. The first Chinese Walmart store was in Shenzhen. Walmart had many well-publicized miscues while learning how to do business in China. Operationally, the scarcity of highly modernized suppliers in China frustrated Walmart’s initial attempts to achieve high levels of efficiency. Barcoding was not standardized in China, and retailers had to either recode goods themselves or distribute labels to suppliers, procedures that increased costs and hindered efficiency. Pressure to appease the government’s desire for local sourcing of products, while maintaining the aura of being American shopping experience, Walmart’s solution was to source about 85 percent of the Chinese stores’ purchases from local manufacturers but heavily weight purchasing toward locally produced American brands (such as products from Procter & Gamble’s factories in China). Walmart also mass-markets Chinese products that were previously available only in isolated parts of the country, such as coconut juice from Guangdong province, hams and mushrooms from rural Yunnan, and oats from Fujian province.
Walmart also learned the importance of building relationships with agencies from the central and local governments and with local communities. Bureaucratic red tape, graft, and lengthy delays in the approval process proved to be aggravating. The company learned to curry favor through actions such as inviting Chinese officials to visit Walmart’s headquarters in the United States, assisting local charities, and even building a school for the local community. A major change in Walmart’s China growth strategy occurred in October 2006. It was announced that the company had outbid competitor’s Carrefour, the United Kingdom’s Tesco, and Lianhua of China to acquire Trust-Mart, a chain of over 100 supercenters located in 20 cities across China. This acquisition, for approximately $1 billion, would immediately give Walmart the largest network of food and department stores in China, with combined sales of over $3billion for 2006.
Different approach for entering Canada and UK
Strong, entrenched competitors in these mature, developed country markets hindered Walmart’s prospects for obtaining critical mass solely through internal growth. Rather than first developing its retail operations from scratch, as in Latin America and Asia, Walmart entered via acquisitions. The company entered Canada by acquiring 122 Woolco stores in 1994. Walmart quickly restructured the money-losing Canadian operations, applying many of the practices that had been successful in the United States. Transition teams were brought in from the United States to help with the transformation, and within two years the Canadian operations were profitable. Its 278 stores, employing 70,000 associates, now account for more than 35 percent of the Canadian discount and department-store retail market. The company entered the United Kingdom in 1999 through the acquisition of the 22 store ASDA group. These acquisitions allowed Walmart to build market share quickly with the highly advanced and competitive European retail market. From this base, additional growth is anticipated through the opening of new stores, supplemented with further acquisitions. It is second-largest supermarket chain in the United Kingdom, with 321 stores and 140,000 associates, but has been losing ground to industry leader Tesco Plc.

Failure in Germany and South Korea

In Europe, Walmart entered Germany by acquiring the profitable 21 unit Wertkauf hypermarket chain in 1998 and 74 Interspar stores in 1999. Acquiring two German companies within a year proved too much for the company to handle with its European Infrastructure.
Efforts to centralize purchasing and leverage Walmart’s famous competencies in information systems and inventory management were stymied by problems with suppliers that were not familiar with such practices. The introduction of Walmart’s “always low prices“ approach met resistance from competitors and regulators. Indeed, the company was ordered by Germany’s Cartel Office to raise prices, charging that Walmart helped to spark a price war by illegally selling some items below cost. Walmart also challenged existing retail practices regarding hours of operation. Laws required shops to close by 8p.m on weekdays and 4 p.m. on Saturdays and to remain closed on Sundays. However, Walmart stores began to open by 7AM, two hours earlier than most competitors, and the company has lobbied for additional reforms to allow later closing times. These changes have sparked vehement opposition from smaller competitors and employees’ unions.

As it struggled to build a strong competitive base, Walmart Germany lost between $120 million and $200 million in 1999, and the losses continued each year following. Cultural factors also played a role in causing an aversion towards the store – Germans are known to be efficient and spend as little time in the shops as possible. However, Walmart’s stalls were placed in such a way that the customer will have to spend more time shop. Walmart put all premium products at eye level, while all the discount products were stored either at the bottom shelve or on the top one. This irritated German customers a lot. Lacking the scale of operations to create competitive advantage, and facing strong competition in a mature marketplace, in July 2006 Walmart announced it was selling its German operations to a competitor, Metro.
With their strategy of “everyday low prices,” Wal-Mart is very successful in the United States and elsewhere. However, due to the extreme competition, Germans are accustomed to the low prices that are offered by numerous discount supermarket chains. For this reason, Wal-Mart’s low price strategy did not create sufficient competitive advantage in Germany.
Earlier that year, Walmart has also announced that it was selling its Korean operations to competitor Shinsegae after Walmart failed to achieve scale and performance in that Asian Market. When first Wal-Mart opened its doors in South Korea in 1998, it was sensational with mixed welcome by competitors and consumers. Wal-Mart had relied on its proven business model and its strategy in offering low prices for products. However, low prices alone were insufficient to make a successful business case in South Korea. South Koreans have different consumer preferences than Americans do; they are not necessarily interested in the same products. For instance, South Koreans like fresh vegetables and fresh food rather than dry products and the type of clothing that Wal-Mart sells. The South Korean culture is also very tied into its markets; they are one of the largest countries that are deeply involved in local markets. Most Wal-Mart outlets in South Korea were placed outside instead of in the cities. South Koreans expect easy accessibility to shopping facilities within the larger cities without the need to travel. Also, South Korean consumers shop more frequently than most Americans do. They may not purchase many things at once, but they will usually get at least one item. Some individuals felt that Wal-Mart should have been located in the center of the cities where consumers felt more comfortable with their shopping needs. South Koreans do not distinguish between discounts and normal prices. Thus, they may not see a compelling reason to shop at Wal-Mart.
Struggle in Japan
Wal-Mart entered Japan in 2002 by using its usual foreign strategy of forming a joint-venture (used to help with economic and political challenges) with Seiyu and begins reorganizing structure; implements point-of-sale and SMART inventory tracking systems across 53 stores. Wal-Mart acquires 34% stake in company in 2003, becoming the Seiyu’s biggest shareholder. By 2008, Wal-Mart completely acquires Seiyu for $875 million, taking 100% ownership of the company and makes Seiyu a subsidiary of the company but struggles to post a profit. Wal-Mart failed to grasp the consumer and retail environment in Japan. With a population of 127 million, the highest per capita income and the second largest economy in the world, Japan is a very attractive market for retailers. The opportunity exists, but there is much more research and planning that needed to be done before expansion began. Instead of adapting business operations to the Japanese culture, the company essentially assumed the Japanese would readily adapt to Wal-Mart’s. This was not the case. For example, in Japan there is a much larger need for local store customization. The culture tends to buy more fresh produce than pre-packaged goods as well (something Wal-Mart does not usually specialize in). Lastly, the Japanese view high price as equaling high quality. This mentality causes them to purchase 40% of the world’s luxury goods annually. Packaging and appearance of goods play a huge role in their purchasing decisions. When looking at Walmart’s product selection, it is obvious they do not usually cater to luxury-brand customers. All of these cultural misunderstandings lead Wal-Mart away from success in Japan.
In Japan there are strong and close-knit supplier webs that provide retailers with their goods. This country puts a higher value on close, local relationships, making it very difficult for foreign firms to enter the industry. With so many changes in products due to local store specifications, it forces firms to deal with many different suppliers. This is not favorable to large retailers, as they don’t have the time or national presence to make the necessary relationships to do business. Wal-Mart is not used to this high level of supplier power. Their value usually comes from cutting costs with suppliers enough to pass onto their customers while using synergy to increase efficiencies. Difficulties managing their supply chain are another substantial reason Wal-Mart is struggling in Japan

India: Anticipating the Opening Up of a Billion Market

Walmart is currently positioning for entry into India, which has the largest population of any nation the company is not currently in. Although it is the world’s eighth –largest retail market at $250 billion, the inefficiency of the Indian retail sector is well-known. Over 95 percent of the retail sales are made through tea stands, newspaper stalls, and mom and pop stores. Strict government barriers have prevented foreign owned retail businesses, although that situation might change soon. However, exploiting the potential of India could be a major challenge, particularly given the country’s notoriously frustrating bureaucracy and poor infrastructure. Walmart will have to learn to manage highly protectionist and anti-capitalist political parties, a bad road system, frequent power outages, and lack of adequate distribution and cold-storage systems, among other concerns. The diversity of the country could also prove problematic, with 18 official languages and widely varying regional consumer cultures. Savvy new Indian chains, such as Provogue and shipper stop are starting to emerge, and nationalist sentiments may produce much sternation for expansion efforts of foreign companies such as Walmart.

In preparing for an eventual opening of the market, Walmart has been building a foundation by establishing relationships with Indian supplier distributors, and consumers. The company has been conducting market studies, hiring a team of local managers, and building relationships with Indian politicians and bureaucrats. In 2005, Walmart purchased $1.5 billion in Indian products for export and sale in its stores abroad. In 2007, Wal-Mart announced with great fanfare that along with Bharti, it planned to open “hundreds” of stores, the kind of ambitious proposition that many international companies hatched early in the century as hopes blossomed that India would soon join China as an emerging economic colossus. Today, Walmart advance on India is barely moving.

Conclusion

Customer needs and interests as well as the nature of competition and the market infrastructure differ from one market to another. Consequently, a firm needs to modify its domestic positional advantage to each market in order to be successful. Walmart enters foreign markets by purchasing large stakes in similar retailers and takes gradual control of ownership by increasing investment through time. Historically these acquisitions are gradual, and have been met with both success and failure. Since Wal-Mart holds so much of the market share, they offer a lot of business to manufacturers and wholesalers. This gives Walmart a lot of power because by Walmart threatening to switch to a different supplier would create a scare tactic to the suppliers. Walmart could vertically integrate. These strategies combining with Walmart’s low price strategy created huge competitive advantages and succeeded in countries like Unites States, Mexico and Brazil but it doesn’t have the same effect in Germany or in Japan where quality comes first than the price for the local people.

The retail giant has struggled in countries like India, South Korea, Germany and Japan as it discovered that its formula for success – low prices, zealous inventory control and a large array of merchandise – did not translate to markets with their own discount chains and shoppers with different habits. Over all, Walmart is still expanding outside the United States, particularly in markets where it entered by acquiring a strong retailer. Still, given Wal-Mart’s formidable record at home, the company’s recent setbacks have exposed a rare vulnerability overseas. Some of WalMart’s problems stem from hubris, a uniquely powerful American enterprise trying to impose its values around the world. At Walmart headquarters in Bentonville, Ark., however, the message from these missteps is now registering loud and clear.

References


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